A recent New York Times article discussing global risks associated with Elon Musk’s SpaceX dominating the satellite internet and space launch markets, along with a report by senior Ukrainian Armed Forces sergeant Robert Brovdi, known as “Madyar,” has sparked another wave of discussion around Starlink in Ukraine.
What happened?
The platoon commander of the second assault company of the 28th Brigade and founder of the “Madyar’s Birds” aerial reconnaissance unit addressed a sensitive topic in a video: the potential suppression of Starlink satellites “to zero” by Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems.
According to the Magyar outlet, citing reliable sources, Russian forces reportedly received experimental devices designed to jam Starlink communications along the front line — the system heavily used by Ukrainian troops for various missions. These so-called “trench jammers,” Madyar says, are meant to disrupt Starlink at distances of 2 to 4 km directly at the line of contact.
Importantly, Madyar only mentioned potential danger. Some Ukrainian media have already published headlines claiming successful Russian interference, though no evidence supports this so far.
What can be said with certainty?
Starlink technology is extremely adaptive, and SpaceX engineers have repeatedly shown how quickly they can adjust system parameters to counter EW attempts. Because EW typically targets receivers, Starlink systems can dynamically alter their configuration the moment interference is detected.
It is well known that Russia has long tried to jam Starlink — without any measurable success. In his recent article, Volodymyr Stepanets, head of the “People’s Connection” organization that supports Starlink integration within the Ukrainian Armed Forces, emphasized that “there has never been and still is no effective method to interfere with Starlink in Mordor.”
Serhii “Flash,” a well-known military communications expert, agrees. Madyar refers to his expertise in the video as an additional safeguard against potential EW effects.
With more than 4,500 active satellites — over 50% of all active satellites in orbit — Starlink cannot be jammed the way Russia once jammed Ukrainian TV signals on Amos and Sirius in 2014, or Viasat before the full-scale invasion. The system also operates under a completely different security standard.
Risks
If GPS signals are suppressed, a Starlink terminal cannot register, or may register but lose speed until the channel collapses entirely. The issue is not geolocation but loss of synchronization received through GPS.
Serhii “Flash” previously reported an intercepted directive from a Russian EW unit discussing potential Starlink GPS vulnerabilities. To create such an effect, EW equipment would need to be placed at height (on a tower or lift) to block signals from high angles — a mandatory requirement for such a scenario. However, this method is only effective at distances up to 500 meters; beyond that, the EW system itself becomes a target. A visible, directional antenna would also be required.
There is currently no systemic or global threat, but frontline soldiers must remain aware of potential evolving risks, as the enemy continues to learn and adapt. As of now, there is no evidence of any Starlink-specific jamming system being effective — or even proven to exist.
Recommendations and Countermeasures
Given the above, experts recommend the following steps to counter future potential Starlink trench jammers:
Bury Starlink terminals up to half a meter deep (the pit should be wide enough to maintain the dish’s field of view).
Use a grounded Faraday cage made from metal mesh with a cell size under 5–7 cm.
Apply additional hardware modifications if needed.
Even more important is communication between frontline troops and higher command. Any potential EW activity affecting Starlink must be reported and processed. According to Volodymyr Stepanets, Starlink Support within the Armed Forces (MOSI 33 or 66 — requiring authorized access) handles such cases. Additional officers and units also have the necessary authority.
Reports must include terminal identifiers, timestamps, and event descriptions. Debug logs, screenshots, and detailed notes are strongly recommended.
Finally, such incidents should not be shared on social media to avoid giving the enemy valuable information.
